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Abstract:  Brain imaging data gathered from functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI) scans in economics is often ad hoc, with little guidance from 
economic theory. Using a very simple economic product differentiation model 
with temporal hazard rates and discounting, the authors incorporate percent signal 
change contrasts from blood-oxygenation-level-dependent (BOLD) scans in a 
logical manner. Using BOLD signals from brain regions implicated in economic 
valuation, the research directly tests the hypotheses from the economic conjecture. 
The empirical test uses a study of consumer decision time regarding milk 
products. Both simple correlations as well as regression analyses support the 
hypothesized relationships providing evidence of the interrelatedness of brain 
activation and theories of differentiation.   
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When considering the length of time to make a decision, nearly all economic 
discussions concern either lengthy delays of years and generations or studies of 
necessarily quick reaction times or decisions made under significant time stress.  
Very little has been written about normal decision times falling within these 
extremes where consumers themselves determine the time to decide, yet this is 
how the majority of daily decisions are made. The goal of this paper is twofold: 
first, to provide an economic framework to a consumer’s decision time and, 
second, to derive from that economic framework some guidance on the use of 
data gathered from a brain scan. The paper builds a simple theoretical model 
combining elements of the economic and psychological literature on decision- 
making in the presence of differentiated products.  This model is consistent with 
recent efforts in the field of neuroeconomics to construct a theoretical rationale 
for the incorporation of the commonly used contrasts from blood-oxygenation-
level-dependent (BOLD) scans generated during functional magnetic resonance 
imaging (fMRI).   
 In 1993, Payne, Bettman and Johnson’s book, The Adaptive Decision 
Maker and Svenson and Maule’s (eds.) Time Pressure and Stress in Human 
Judgment and Decision Making presented the results of numerous studies on how 
decisions in the face of time pressure are made.  Discussion of decision time 
heuristics under time pressure such as the effort-accuracy models have been 
subjected to much empirical work seeking to determine how decision-makers 
make the risk-return calculations necessary for efficient choices and how people 
adapt their decision making strategies under the pressure of opportunity cost.  
With more recent developments in the field of neuroscience and behavioral 
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economics, the foundations beneath how the brain makes quick decisions has 
emerged.  Bestsellers like Gladwell’s (2005) Blink: The Power of Thinking 
without Thinking and Kahneman’s (2011) Thinking Fast and Slow, detail the 
scientific exploration of how decisions are made with Kahneman condensing 
much of the research on choices into one of two types:  quicker, automatic 
“system 1” choices and  slower, deliberative “system 2” choices. In much of 
economics, however, little attention has been given to what influences the 
decision time in everyday choices. Yet, psychologists and neuroscientists have 
performed a myriad of studies to better characterize decision times.   
 Many decisions are made quickly and often with uncertain information.  
With computer trading, the speed of financial decisions is approaching 
instantaneous.  Even with so-called “breaker switches” built into the technology, 
human overseers find themselves making decisions in tenths of seconds, 
occasionally with disastrous side effects.  The “flash crash” of May 6, 2010 is 
now famous.  At 2:42 pm, a high-frequency trade program at a single mutual fund 
triggered a buy-and-sell chain reaction with other firms’ trading programs 
dropping the Dow index by 600 points ($4.1 billion in market value).  A 
combination of programs and human traders caused the index to slingshot back to 
its initial value by 3:07 pm leaving traders and regulators scrambling to figure out 
whether the drop was based on fundamental changes to market valuations, 
software glitches, or collusion (Bowley 2010).  Though most “Financial Black 
Swans” are less dramatic than the 2010 event, they are nevertheless regular 
occurrences in today’s financial markets (Johnson et al. 2012).   Industry traders 
and regulators are considering regulations that would slow down trades to a still 
astoundingly quick 50 milliseconds between an offer and a trade (Popper 2012). 
Better economic understanding is needed for how decision times of short duration 
are affected.    
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 Stock trading is a dramatic example of financial decision-making because 
of the size of the valuations, but all people make daily decisions in very short time 
intervals. Experiments have shown that humans can react with hand signals to 
visual stimuli in as little as 23 milliseconds (Blinkov and Nikandrov 2002).  
Longer times are needed when a thoughtful decision must be made, though in 
many decisions, the time is still measured in less than a second or two.  The 
greater one’s expertise and information (whether in trading, shopping, or driving) 
the less time is needed (Visser et al 2007).  For comparison, a chess grand master 
needs roughly 650 milliseconds to determine whether a king is in peril (Johnson 
et al. 2012) while typical drivers need 1,500 milliseconds to brake unexpectedly 
but about half that time when the stop is expected (Green 2000).  One could say 
that experienced drivers facing a typical commute are as much an expert at 
driving as a grand master is at playing chess as measured by reaction time.  
Milosavljevic, Koch and Rangel (2011) show that when faced with known 
products, healthy adults can take as little as 313 milliseconds to decide which of 
the two goods they prefer.  Another study demonstrated that when hungry, 
participants facing pairs of real food choices take only 1,700-2,700 milliseconds 
to decide (Krajbich, Armel and Rangel 2010).  In a study using some of the same 
data that will be used in the present work, Crespi et al. (2015) found that regions 
of interest in a decision phase of an economic choice of milk products differed 
from regions involved in the deliberation over that choice. What Crespi et al. 
(2015) did not offer was an economic theory to help understand how those ROIs 
fit into the decision time needed to make such economic decisions. 
 The goal of this paper is twofold: first, to provide an economic framework 
to a consumer’s decision time and, second, to derive from that economic 
framework some guidance on the use of data gathered from a functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) brain scan. The paper builds a simple theoretical 
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model combining elements of the economic and psychological literature on 
decision-making in the presence of differentiated products.  An extension of the 
general model then incorporates the commonly used contrast method from blood-
oxygenation-level-dependent (BOLD) scans generated during fMRI.  With the 
growing use of these techniques, economists have been challenged (e.g. Caplan 
and Dean 2007, Glimcher, Kable and Louie 2007, Bernheim 2009, Levy and 
Glimcher 2012, Farb 2013) to find ways of incorporating the neural findings into 
economic theory in a meaningful way.  While arguments have been made that 
neuroeconomics needs better linkages between brain activity and economic theory 
(see reviews in Farb 2013 and Glimcher, Kable and Louie 2007), such links are 
arguably more difficult with BOLD variables than with other measures of brain 
activity because an fMRI scan provides only a snapshot of neural activity in a 
single task and BOLD variables are then constructed as an average across these 
tasks.  As Webb et al. (2013) demonstrate, more theoretical work is needed to link 
particular constructions of BOLD contrasts to traditional utility but the more this 
is achieved, the greater the usefulness of fMRI.  Important first steps have been 
made to incorporate BOLD variables in this way (see Glimcher 2009, Webb et al. 
2013).  The model in this paper creates such a link via well-known models of 
product differentiation and discounting leading to refutable hypotheses of the 
impact of economic and neurological variables on time-to-decision. The novelty 
in this paper is demonstrating that product differentiation models with 
exponentially discounted opportunity costs of decision-time can be manipulated 
to express decision-time as a percentage change in an underlying marginal 
valuation.  As such, it is not just the measurement of decision time that is of 
interest, but also the relationship among the economic covariates, especially the 
marginal valuation expression, and decision time that leads to testable 
implications on the usage of BOLD percentage signal changes in areas of the 
brain associated with valuation.  The importance of the economic theory is that it 
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provides the comparative statics for the direction of the effects.  The empirical 
results support the economic framework and show economic variables such as the 
opportunity cost of a consumer’s time, magnitude of price differential among 
competing goods, and the certainty of the choices affect decision time in 
predictable ways. Most importantly, the empirical results demonstrate that BOLD 
activations in areas known to be associated with valuation and uncertainty also 
affect decision time in a manner predicted by an economic theory of product 
differentiation.   
Background.  
Until recently, when modeling decision time, economists have mostly focused on 
the time value of money and its impact on choices over relatively long planning 
horizons. Even when choices are made quickly, the emphasis is how these choices 
impact future payoffs in the realm of days, months or years. Examples are many 
but a selection of articles includes Hotelling (1925) on the optimal time to sell a 
depreciating asset; Diamond (1965) on the choices between consumption in one 
generation versus consumption in another; the impact of search costs on 
unemployment (Mellow 1978), inflation (Paroush 1986), and industrial 
organization (Stiglitz 1987, Stahl 1989); Brown, Chua and Camerer (2009) on 
lifetime savings rates, Andersen et al. (2008) and Andreoni and Sprenger (2012) 
on experimental approaches to eliciting time preferences (see Frederick et al. 
2002 for a review), impulsive or seemingly self-destructive behavior and long 
term health effects (Becker and Murphy 1988, Chaloupka 1991, Grossman, 
Chaloupka and Sirtalan 1998), and the number of works on the effect of time and 
discount rates on consumption in the macroeconomy are so numerable that they 
are best left to perusals of textbook references (e.g. Romer 1996).  Many works 
attribute the differences in choices to differences in underlying temporal 
discounting functions (e.g. Loewenstein and Elster 1992, Loewenstein and Prelec 
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1992, Laibson 1997, Myerson, Green and Warusawitharana 2001, Green and 
Myerson 2004).  Phelps and Pollak (1968) posited a utility framework for 
intertemporal altruism that was subsequently adapted in work on the timing of 
decisions by Laibson (1997), O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999) and McClure et al. 
(2004). Laibson (1997) generalized the discussion to how consumers make 
discounting decisions.  Much of the discussion in Laibson (1997) and subsequent 
papers concerns whether discount functions are more-or-less exponential 
(preferences are discounted consistently over time, Samuelson 1937) or another 
form like a hyperbolic discount (which could explain why agents react to nearby 
decisions differently than more distant ones). Yet the impact of decisions over 
very short time intervals has generally not been studied in economics. This is 
surprising given the number of daily transactions that fit such a description. Per 
capita, per-unit time costs of such decisions are extremely low, yet the cumulative 
effect of an extra second of decision time per product and per person in a large 
economy can be substantial.  
 In cognitive psychology, however, there is great interest in how fast it 
takes a person to make a choice given the perception of the objects in the choice 
set.  “Drift-diffusion” or “accumulator” models are used when decision time is of 
interest, whether “mistakes” are made as time is shortened or how response time 
is affected when product attributes are altered.1  Under these types of designs, the 
                                                          
1 The concept is important to understand for the model proposed in the next section.  Think of two 
choices before a participant as being denoted the “left” choice and the “right” choice.  The choice 
set is withheld from the participant and with no knowledge of the unseen choices it is 
hypothesized that an internal information signal is at the point of indifference, a midpoint.  As 
soon as a participant views the choices, a chronometer is started.  As time progresses, the 
participant is assumed to increase her knowledge while making the choice so that the cumulative 
relative value of the information signal moves leftward or rightward.  Thinking of each choice as 
existing on the frontier of an imaginary barrier and at time t=0, the consumer is at a midpoint 
between the two barriers, then at t>0 a choice is made when the consumer’s cumulative relative 
information value crosses either the right or left barrier.   
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theory is that a person compiles product information and once the information 
retrieval reaches a person-specific, but unobservable threshold level, a decision is 
made.  As such, the recording of time-to-choice is a proxy for product information 
with shorter response times indicating faster information retrieval. Interested 
readers are referred to the discussion and reviews of the literature in Townsend 
and Ashby (1983), Bloxom (1985), Ratcliff and Rouder (1998), Smith and van 
Zandt (2000), Rustichini (2009), and Simen et al (2011).  The psychological 
research on response time is evident in marketing research as well (e.g. 
MacLachlan, Czepiel and LaBarbera 1979, Tyebjee 1979, MacLachlan and Myers 
1983, and Haaijer, Kamakura and Wedel 2000).  Neuroeconomics, an emerging 
field melding economics, psychology, and neuroscience, seems the only sub-
discipline in economics examining decision times with many of these being 
reaction time studies.  Experiments such as McClure et al. (2004), Kable and 
Glimcher (2007), Basten et al (2010), Milosavljevic et al. (2010), Krajbich, Armel 
and Rangel (2010), Milosavljevic, Koch and Rangel (2011), Krajbich and Rangel 
(2011), Krajbich et al (2012) examine the interaction between response times, 
functional brain activations, and subjective valuations of the goods.  Indeed, these 
latter models, especially Krajbich et al. (2012), make progress toward a 
theoretical neural model for response times based upon inferences about how the 
brain gathers information.  Still many of these studies focus on reaction time, with 
interest in how quickly and accurately someone can make a decision.  Further, 
although these models have important economic interpretations, they do not 
follow the standard paradigm (Sutton 2000) of providing a refutable hypothesis 
from an underlying economic theory; though they certainly go a long way toward 
developing an underlying neural theory of decisions.  Although they can and do, 
as Basten et al. (2010, p. 4) claim, “demonstrate the power of model-driven fMRI 
analysis” the models utilized are typically of the drift-diffusion or related 
information-gathering algorithms. To our knowledge, no decision-time models 
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using fMRI derive testable implications based upon an underlying theory of 
economic choice allowing predictions of the direction of effect when prices, 
qualities, or measured BOLD signals change.  Further, as opposed to reaction 
time studies, our interest is in the more typical case of decision times under less 
pressure.  For example, in a typical shopping trip where there is some opportunity 
cost of time but where shoppers may encounter new and unfamiliar products 
requiring deliberation.  It is our hope that the simple model that follows provides 
fodder for future research as a complementary means of advancing the research 
on decision times and the use of fMRI data in an economically obvious manner. 
Conceptual model. 
Our interest is decision times over relatively short durations but this is not a 
reaction time model.  In reaction time experiments, participants are instructed to 
make decisions quickly. Shoppers, however, are not told to move through a 
supermarket quickly and traders may feel pressure to buy or sell, but such 
pressure is self-imposed.  A good starting point is asking where the pressure to 
make a choice comes from in these day-to-day decisions?  The standard answer 
would be the opportunity cost of time.  We begin our framework combining the 
intertemporal choice model of Laibson (1997) with a similar parameterization of 
utility used extensively in the literature on product differentiation developed by 
Mussa and Rosen (1978). We add to these the spirit of the information-gathering 
axioms as discussed in Rustichini (2009) with regard to information contained in 
quality signals.   
 Rustichini (2009, p. 42) argues “that the time to decide (the response time 
that we observe) is a hill-shaped function of the quality of information.”  The hill 
shape is due to a tradeoff in decision time between collecting more information 
(the upward slope of the hill) and the opportunity cost of time (the downward 
slope).  In the model we propose, participants have a monetary endowment and 
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must make a decision that impacts this endowment with no restriction on how 
long that choice may take. Consider the decision of shopper i with endowment iy  
facing a decision to purchase one of two goods offered at respective prices 1p and 
2p . Unlike Laibson (1997), we are interested in time intervals of short duration 
such as a typical supermarket decision and for that reason endowment and prices 
are unchanged over time. The goods have measurable attributes (e.g. size, shape, 
nutrition, color, sugar content, price-equity ratio, etc.) as well as more subjective 
attributes as perceived by, and hence particular to, the consumer (e.g. taste, 
healthiness, environmental impacts of the purchase, brand, etc.).  Following the 
convention of Mussa and Rosen (1978) the experience qualities, denoted 1q and 
2q , of the two goods are non-negative such that larger values construe higher 
quality to a consumer. The consumer chooses between the two goods based upon 
her perception of the qualities.  For example, if 1 2q q> and prices were equal then 
the consumer would purchase the good with quality 1q (vertical differentiation). 
To induce a consumer to purchase good 2 in this case, its price must fall relative 
to good 1. 
 While the endowment, prices, and quality do not change over the short 
time-to-decision model, something must account for the opportunity cost of time 
and for the benefit of pondering a decision.  Rustichini’s (2009) “hill” analogy 
means that if there is no new information to be gained then the consumer’s 
perceived utility decreases while pondering the choices. The need to ponder the 
choices arises if one or both of the qualities is uncertain.  We use this assertion in 
our combination of the Mussa and Rosen (1978) and the Laibson (1997) models 
to create a model of substitute goods with time-dependent utility over quality 
valuation. Consumers maximize utility subject to their budget constraint and the 
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resulting value (indirect utility) to consumer i considering the purchase of one unit 
of good j is given by equation (1): 
(1) ( ) ( ) ( ), 1,..., ; 1, 2; (0, )ij i i j i j ij i iV t y p q r t i n j t Tδ β= − + = = ∈  
Until the product is actually purchased (or consumed), equation (1) can be 
thought of as an expected value.  The parameter 0iβ ≥ is the marginal utility of 
quality that is unique to each consumer. In the Mussa-Rosen treatment iβ  
converts the quality signal, jq , into a money-metric marginal valuation translating 
a consumer’s quality perceptions into her personal valuation.  Each individual has 
her own “neural currency” an argument proffered in Levy and Glimcher (2012) 
and ijV  is measured in this neural currency. As such, consumers must also have 
personal exchange rates that translate market prices and income into their neural 
currency otherwise the valuations between prices and quality would not be 
comparable. iδ denotes the individual’s neural exchange rate such that if a 
consumer’s income is given by iy  and the market price of good j is given by jp  
then she internally exchanges these into her neural currency at the rate of iδ .   It is 
reasonable that, like prices and income, the exchange parameters iβ  and iδ are not 
time dependent in the very short run.2   
 As measured here, ti is the time it takes the individual to make a decision 
with time T representing the moment when a purchase is made.  Time is a proxy 
                                                          
2 Alternative models in line with this specification could be letting ( )i i iq v q= with ( ) 0i iqv >′  and 
having consumers choose units of the good itself.  Likewise, one could replace β  with a more 
general formulation ( )g β  where ( ) 0g β′ >  and ( ) 0g β′′ < .  As noted in Mussa and Rosen (1978, 
footnote 2), none of these changes would alter the fundamental aspects of the model but may 
prove useful in future analyses. For some purposes modeling such a choice might be undertaken 
by adding a time constraint, much like a labor-leisure tradeoff model.  We do not do so here. 
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for information retrieval and it is this information gathering that affects a good’s 
marginal valuation through the function ( )ij ir t .   There are many theories as to 
how information is actually received and used in the brain.  Drift diffusion or 
accumulator models assume that information is updated over time based upon the 
information obtained in the most recent observation.  Following this, we consider 
an autocorrelated function whereby   ( ) ( 1) ( )ij i ij i ij ir t r t u t= − +  where ( )ij iu t  is a 
new piece of information that is either accepted or rejected and updates the 
information in the consumer’s decision making (assuming a Markov updating 
process is a common assumption in the drift-diffusion literature). 
 Time spent considering a purchase is the same for both products and 
affects the information retrieval functions in a similar though not necessarily 
identical fashion.  Time spent contemplating a purchase has benefits (an upward 
sloping portion) and costs (downward sloping portion).  It is instructive to think of 
( )ij ir t  as a compound function.  For some t , we posit ( ) 0ij ir t t′ ≤ ≥  and 
( ) 0ij ir t t′′ ≤ ≤   on the portion of the information retrieval function representing an 
information retrieval “hazard rate.” As time progresses, the retrieval function 
takes on more the role of discount rate where  ( ) 0ij ir t t′ > <  and ( ) 0ij ir t T′′ < ≥ . 
This discount portion is the cost of delaying the purchase affecting the marginal 
valuation of the good’s quality: further deliberation may give you some 
information, but it is also begins wasting your time.    Figure 1 provides an 
example using a Weibull function with an additive random error.3  As 
Kahnemann (2011) discusses, deliberating is effortful and the sooner a decision is 
made, the sooner the brain can redirect attention to a less effortful activity.  
                                                          
3 Specifically, 1( ) ( 1) exp( ( 1) ) tr t k t k t u
α αα −= − − − + with 0.03k = , 1.6α =  and  the error is 




Figure 1. Example of the information retrieval functions using a Weibull 
distribution with error. 
 One would expect that upon subsequent encounters, decision time lessens, 
which is equivalent in this model to a higher level of utility or, more formally, the 
information retrieval hazard rate having less of an effect than the discount rate on 
deliberation.4 Under the diffusion hypothesis, shorter decision times occur 
because of cumulative information reducing choice time. The analogy is similar in 
our model, but our model also explains why a shorter shopping decision is 
preferable to begin with: time negatively impacts value once an adequate amount 
of information has been retrieved.  Many purchase decisions take mere seconds, 
                                                          
4 A case for lower cost is analogous: people become practiced at a choice, allowing the more 
“automatic” cognitive processes to take over and this automatic process is utility enhancing 
because the opportunity cost of thinking time is high (Kahneman 2011).   
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and we are not considering large changes in welfare. However, even small 
changes will affect the purchasing decisions at the margin, which is a matter of 
importance to firms in their marketing decisions and for traders who must often 
make extremely fast decisions with limited information. Under Mussa-Rosen, the 
implication of this model is that time to decision indicates “indifference” though it 
might better be termed as “indecision.”  From equation (1), deliberation is a result 
of the information functions constantly rebalancing an indifference equation, 
1 2( ) ( )i iV t T V t T< = < , until enough information retrieval forces an inequality.  It 
is reasonable to believe that a consumer would determine with a heuristic 
developed a priori whether products are “close enough” to some preferred value.  
Appending error terms provides the context for an information retrieval random 
walk (Ratcliff 1978) so that not only are choices made with error but indifference 
is maintained as long as  1 2( ) ( )i i iV t T V t T ε< − < = with [ , ]i uε ∈  where   and u 
provide lower and upper thresholds that must be crossed in order to make a 
choice.  Though we do not use this formulation, doing so would allow the model 
to be interpretable as a simple drift-diffusion model where until some small 
neighborhood of T is reached it must not be the case that enough time has passed 
to move the consumer beyond a range of indifference between the value of the 
two goods.  This is not the same as saying the consumer is indifferent between the 
two goods, just indifferent between their values.  The consumer must take into 
account the overall impact on her valuation from prices and pondering the 
choices, and even though opportunity cost of time may affect both goods in the 
same way, quality, prices and retrieving information do not.  If one considers the 
way in which decisions are made in this model when facing two choices, a 
consumer has two possible states.  Once there is no added benefit from 
considering the goods, either the consumer has a preference or the consumer is 
perfectly indifferent.  In either case, a choice will be made: the preferred product 
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in the former and either product chosen at random in the latter.5  In this way we 
can examine the case of indifference near the point of decision without loss of 
generality.6 
 Noting that the time it takes to make a decision is an externality to the 
choice itself, indifference/indecision implies:  
(2) 1 1 2 2 1 2( ) ( ) ( ) / .i i i i i ir t q r t q p pδ β− = −    
Without knowing more about the functional forms the impact of decision time on 
the relationship is uncertain.  Equation (2) nonetheless provides the framework for 
how long a consumer will ponder a good and we can see that the relationship 
between the value of the good and the neural exchange rate as well as difference 
in prices and qualities impact the time to decision in specific ways. The difference 
on the left of equation (2) is demonstrated in Figure 2 along with its two 
information retrieval functions.7   If one can make assertions about this difference, 
one could discern how the parameters in equation (2) impact decision time.  We 
next consider an example. 
                                                          
5 Think of the case of perfect substitutes where the budget line falls along the indifference curve.  
In that case, consumers randomly choose from either good.  If the slope of the budget line differs 
from the marginal rate of substitution, however, a preference for one of the two goods is revealed. 
6 Since the intersection of the sets for “preference” and “indifference” is empty, the time it takes to 
discover one has a preference is the same time it takes to discover one has lost indifference. For a 
similar treatment see Andersen et al. 2008, equation (1). 
7 Specifically, q1 = q2 = 1 and the top function is the same Weibull formulation from Figure 1 




Figure 2. Differencing the information retrieval functions. 
An Example: Identical Information Retrieval. 
 Consider the case where time reveals the same information for both goods: 
1 2( ) ( ) ( )i i i i i ir t r t r t= = . This might be the case where, regardless how long the 
consumer ponders the goods, the information does not greatly distinguish them.  
This is not to say the two goods are identical, for that depends as well on the 
underlying quality, qi. Over the ranges of t discussed above, the information 
retrieval function could be reasonably assumed one-to-one such that t may be 
solved over each interval from it t≤  and from it t> : 
(3) ( )1 1 2 1 2( ) / ( )i i it r p p q qδ β−= − − . 
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 Take for example the case depicted in figures 1 and 2 using a Weibull 
function 1( ) ( 1) exp( ( 1) )i ii i i i ir t k t k t
α αα −= − − − with 0iα >  and 0 1ik< <  (and 
( ) 0iu t =  for simplicity).  The hazard function dominating the early stage of 
decision (where information retrieval has a positive effect on value) is given by: 
(4) ( )1/( 1)1 2 1 21 ( ) / ( ) , 1,..., ; (0, ]ii i i i i it p p k q q i n t t
αδ α β −= + − − = ∈ , 









q q p pt i n t t T
k
α
β δ − − −
= + = ∈ 
 
, 
 Different functions and different assumptions will obviously produce 
different relationships.  For example, one could consider the case where one good 
requires no information retrieval and the consumer is comparing it with a rival 
that is brand new (or “New and Improved”), so only one of the information 
retrieval functions is necessary to include in equation (2).  Other assumptions can 
lead to other specifications.  The point of the example is that although equation 
(2) is only implicitly defined, it still can serve as a framework for experiments.  
As long as it is believed the information retrieval function is composed of both a 
hazard rate and a discount rate, more assumptions about how information is 
retrieved or the types of goods offered can provide guidance to the development 
of refutable implications.  We next demonstrate this in an experiment using fMRI. 
A Closer Examination of the Discount Function in an fMRI Experiment 
 One can imagine after many experimental trials with repeat choices, a 
subject’s hazard rate is likely close to constant for the choices.  Furthermore, even 
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in the case of an increasing hazard rate for one or both of the goods, a reasonable 
argument can be made that the discount portion of the information retrieval is 
identical for both goods in an experiment as the discount rate is impacted by each 
subject’s personal opportunity cost of participating in the experiment.  At some 
point after repeated observations, a subject’s time pondering is lowering utility 
regardless the eventual choice.  To model the idea that there is a desire for making 
a decision quickly, drift diffusion experiments often use thresholds that decay 
over time, and an empirical regularity in this research (see Milosavljevic et al. 
2010) is that the contact thresholds for two goods decay identically and 
exponentially, making the Weibull function with 1ijα =  and 0 1ik< < a 
reasonable place to examine the retrieval function and show how the underlying 
variables can be proxied by frequently used variables obtained from fMRI 
analysis. 
 Following this framework, denoting 1 2p p p≡ −  and 1 2q q q≡ − , equation 
(5) can be written as: 




ψ= + + −  . 
 The term (ln ln )i i iψ β δ= − is the percentage difference in a consumer’s 
neural valuation of quality and her neural valuation of wealth. Although such 
valuations, like utility, are not comparable across individuals, their percentage 
changes would be in this formulation.  fMRI can be used to measure percent signal 
change in brain activation between two experimental conditions known as contrast 
or subtraction method and such percentage changes are comparable across subjects 
(see for example Amaro Jr. and Barker 2006, p. 223). Kable and Glimcher (2007), 
Glimcher (2009) and Levy et al. (2011) argue that a participant’s subjective 
valuation of a good is strongly correlated with particular BOLD variables extracted 
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from centers of the brain known to be related to valuation.  Specifically, Glimcher 
(2009, p. 509) argues, “subjective values are linearly proportional to the BOLD 
signal.”  As such, the model presented here augments the current research seeking 
an economic usage of BOLD contrasts from regions of interest (ROIs) as opposed 
to the more common usage of BOLD variables in an exogenous fashion (see 
Bernheim 2009 for a review). Further, the model shows that such value-laden 
BOLD variables have economically testable implications for time to decision over 
the portion of the decision where the discount rate dominates.  Specifically, for a 
particular set of choices, consumers with a larger exchange rate for prices than for 
the good’s value ( 0)iψ <  make faster decisions than an otherwise identical 
consumer with a positive rate of exchange ( 0)iψ > . Nevertheless, the overall 
impact of this rate of change on decision time during the discounting period is 
positive ( 0)i idt dψ >  thus as this rate for either type of consumer increases, the 
time-to-decision increases.  
 Equation (6) implies that as time goes on, the greater the ratio of the relative 
prices leads to quicker decisions ( 0idt dp < ) as will the higher a consumer’s 
opportunity cost of time ( 0i idt dk < ).   The greater the differentiation between the 
quality of the goods the longer will be the decision time ( 0idt dq > ).  At first pass 
this might seem counterintuitive; after all, if goods are very distinct, would not that 
make a decision easier?  But recall we are talking about time of indifference, so the 
goods are substitutes. The closer the goods are to being perfect substitutes, the 
easier it is to make a decision: as qualities converge ( 0)q → , the choice is easier 
even if it is chosen randomly, so the time to make the choice declines.8   
                                                          
8 Compounding this relationship, however is that the greater the marginal utility from the qualities 
also increases the decision time ( 0
i i
dt dβ > ), ceteris paribus.  This is not immediately intuitive 
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 Again, this is not a model of reaction times, where a consumer must make 
a decision as quickly as possible.  In this current model, the time-to-decision is 
impacted not only in the relative degree of certainty between the two products, but 
also in their relative prices, as well as the cost of the time involved to make the 
decision in the first place.  A straightforward extension of this model will be used 
in part of the experiment that follows to examine whether regions of the brain are 
active when the choices are between (1) quality attributes and price alone or (2) a 
combination of quality attributes and price with price alone. The impact on the 
comparative statics in doing so would be that the sign of idt dp  could be either 
positive or negative if quality is a function of price.  This is undertaken based 
upon experiments indicating some participants do use price to discern the quality 
of a good. 9   
The experiment.10 
Fifty healthy, right-handed, English-speaking, adult participants (ages 18-55; 
mean = 31.6 years; SD = 11.0; 24 females) were recruited from the Kansas City 
                                                          
and is why the model is important to understand the interaction of knowledge and decision time.  
As the utility one gets for the quality of the goods increases, a consumer’s decision will be very 
fast if the two goods are similar ( 0)q → but slower if the two goods are dissimilar. Suppose a 
consumer shopping for a new vehicle places a higher value on sport utility vehicles (SUV) than on 
passenger (Pass) cars (
SUV Pass
β β> ), but is considering both vehicle types and in each vehicle type 
there are two choices.  What the model shows is that if the difference in qualities between the two 
SUVs is equal to the difference in qualities between the two passenger cars ( )SUV Passq q=  , the 
consumer will spend more time considering the SUVs, the choice with the higher valuation.  This 
result says nothing about the choice that eventually gets made; only that it is logical to spend more 
time considering choices with higher valuations. 
9 A nice example of this is given in Otter, Allenby and van Zandt (2008) who find that when 
television set attributes and prices are similar, decision time declined.  Implicitly, consumers with 
imperfect knowledge about quality use price to provide a quality signal in comparison shopping.  
Including price as a signal of quality in our model could lead to the same result.  
10 As noted in the introduction, much of the data used in this part of the paper was also used in 
Crespi et al. (2015).  Hence, the discussion concerning the experimental design and extraction of 
the BOLD variables from the regions of interest in this and the next two sections is nearly 
identical to the discussion in Crespi et al. (2015). It is offered for completeness. 
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metropolitan area using internet advertisements and broadcast emails to undergo 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) scanning.11 All fMRI scans were 
performed at the Hoglund Brain Imaging Center on a 3-Tesla Siemens Skyra 
(Siemens, Erlangen, Germany) scanner. Participants’ heads were immobilized 
with head cushions. Following automated scout image acquisition and shimming 
procedures performed to optimize field homogeneity, a structural scan was 
completed. T1-weighted, three-dimensional, magnetization-prepared rapid 
acquisition with gradient echo (MPRAGE) structural images were acquired 
(repetition time/echo time [TR/TE] = 23/4 ms, flip angle = 8º, field of view 
[FOV] = 256 mm, matrix = 256 x 192, slice thickness = 1 mm). Then, two 
gradient-echo BOLD functional scans were acquired in fifty contiguous, oblique, 
40º axial slices (TR/TE = 3000/25 ms, flip angle = 90º, FOV = 232 mm, matrix = 
80 x 80, slice thickness = 3 mm, in-plane resolution = 2.9 x 2.9 mm, 176 data 
points). To optimize the signal in ventromedial prefrontal regions of interest in the 
present study, and to minimize susceptibility artifacts, all participants were 
positioned such that the angle of the anterior commissure-posterior commissure 
(AC-PC) plane fell between 17º and 22º in scanner coordinate space, as verified 
by a localization scan. This careful positioning, utilized by Bruce et al. (2013), 
ensured the 40º acquisition angle was applied uniformly for all participants, again, 
minimizing susceptibility artifacts while standardizing the head positions of 
participants of divergent body sizes. 
 
                                                          
11 Exclusion criteria included current psychotropic medication use, current or past substance 
abuse, participant report of diagnosis of severe psychopathology (e.g. depression, schizophrenia), 
current vegan diet, and self-reported lactose intolerance (due to the milk product stimuli). 
Educational attainment was reported as high school (n = 26%), some college (n = 26%), 
bachelor’s degree (n = 40%), and graduate degree (n = 8%). Household income was evenly 
distributed; by self-report, annual household incomes were less than $20,000 (n = 15, 30%), 
between $20,000 and $39,999 (n = 10, 20%), between $40,000-$59,999 (n = 14; 28%), between 
$60,000-$79,999 (n = 6; 12%), between $80,000-$99,999 (n = 4; 8% and greater than $100,000 
per year (n = 1; 2%). 
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fMRI Experimental Paradigm 
For the experiment we chose milk, a product that would be commonly known and 
frequently purchased. Individuals who reported lactose intolerance or a current 
vegan diet were excluded.  Specifically, we used images of typical, handled 
plastic-gallon jugs of milk that would be familiar to shoppers. Aside from the 
wording beneath the images, the images were identical. To introduce 
differentiation in the choice quality, technology attribute images were labeled 
with the following statements: “From cloned cow” or “Not from cloned cow” and 
“Artificial growth hormone” or “No added growth hormone.” Milk from cloned 
cows has been approved by the FDA as safe for human consumption but has not 
entered the market at the time of this study. Milk from cows receiving growth 
hormones has been approved for human consumption but has proven unpopular 
with consumers (in fact many milk brands explicitly label that they do not contain 
milk from cows receiving growth hormones–particularly recombinant bovine 
somatotropin, or, rBST). Table 1 provides some insight into the subject’s 
familiarity with the labels we used as well as knowledge of other food production 
technologies.  The first two rows of Table 1 reveal that the typical participant was 





Table 1.  Participant familiarity with Milk Products used in the Experiment. 
Question Avg Min Max Notes 
1. How much do you know about farm animal 
cloning? 2.38 1 7  
2. How much do you know about rBST used in 
dairy cattle? 1.62 1 6  
3. How much do you know about artificial growth 
hormones? 2.80 1 7  
4. How much do you know about how organic 


















6. Milk from cloned cows contains genes, but milk 




















 Notes: In questions 1-4 the scales are 1= “No knowledge”, 4= “Some knowledge” and 7= “A lot 
of knowledge.” In questions 5-7, participants were asked to rate the statement as “False” or “True” 
and their answers were coded as 0=False; 1=True.   
 Each participant underwent a series of fMRI scans, including two localizer 
scans, a structural scan, and three functional scans. For the functional scans, 
images were back-projected onto a screen mounted at the rear of the fMRI 
scanner’s bore, and participants viewed these images through a mirror integrated 
into the head coil.  The first functional scan was a “passive viewing” design 
where subjects observed the products one by one and no decisions were made (see 
the top half of Figure 3). The passive viewing experiment is detailed in Bruce et 
al. (2014).  Next, participants were presented with 84 binary choices between two 
milk products (see the bottom half of Figure 3 for an example). The products in 
each choice were labeled with information about the products’ prices and the 
technologies used to produce them. These labels differed according to three 
conditions: a “price” condition, in which the price of one product was high, and 
the other low, but the technologies used to produce them were the same; a 
“technology quality,” in which the technology used to produce one product was 
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controversial, and the other conventional, but their prices were the same; and a 
“combination” condition, in which the prices of the two products differed, as did 
the technology qualities. Before choosing, participants were presented with the 
following instructions: “You will make a series of choices between two food 
products. To choose the option on the left, use your index finger. To choose the 
option on the right, use your middle finger. Please choose carefully, as you will 
receive one of the food products you choose at the end of the experiment.” They 
were given a half-gallon of milk to take home at the conclusion of their 
participation in the study with the price of the milk they chose deducted from the 
$50 they received for participating in the experiment.  To more closely simulate 
shopping behavior, participants were allotted unlimited time to make each choice 
(e.g. optimal decisions and decision time rather than speed of decision was the 
focus).  Following each choice, participants were presented a confirmation screen 
indicating which choice they had selected for 0.5 seconds. There were two 




Passive Viewing Example. 
  
Active Choice Example. 
Figure 3. Illustrations of fMRI experimental paradigms (top: passive viewing, bottom: 




fMRI Data Analysis 
Functional magnetic resonance imaging data were initially analyzed using the 
BrainVoyager QX statistical package and random effects (Brain Innovation, 
Maastricht, Netherlands, 2004). Preprocessing steps included trilinear 3D motion 
correction, sinc-interpolated slice scan time correction, 3D spatial smoothing with 
4-mm Gaussian filter, and high pass filter temporal smoothing. Functional images 
were realigned to the anatomic images obtained within each session and 
standardized using BrainVoyager Talairach transformation, which conforms to 
the space defined by the Talairach and Tournoux’s (1988) stereotaxic atlas. 
Functional scans were discarded if participants moved more than 4 mm along any 
axis (x, y, or z). Two runs were discarded due to excess motion and three 
participants were unable to complete Phase 2, leaving a total of 92 runs. 
 Activation maps were analyzed using statistical parametric methods 
(Friston et al. 1995) contained within the BrainVoyager QX software. Statistical 
contrasts, or differences, in the blood oxygenation level-dependent (BOLD) 
activations between the price and technology conditions and price and 
combination conditions were conducted using multiple regression analysis with 
the general linear model (GLM) with motion parameters included as nuisance 
regressors. Regressors representing the experimental conditions of interest were 
modeled with a hemodynamic response filter and entered into the multiple-
regression analysis using a random-effects model. Contrasts between conditions 
of interest were assessed with t statistics. Multiple comparisons were corrected for 
using a familywise error rate based on a Monte Carlo simulation conducted within 
the BrainVoyager software (k = 16 voxels) (Goebel et al. 2006; Lieberman and 
Cunningham 2009); further details of these tests are left out of the present paper 
but are available from the authors.   
 Milk produced using new technologies is posited to impact consumers’ 
valuation of milk, hence our focus after the whole brain analysis was on ROIs 
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related to valuation.  Levy and Glimcher (2012) synthesized much of the fMRI 
literature on revealed preferences to find common activation areas hypothesized 
to be related to valuation in vmPFC and other areas.  They challenged the 
profession to begin focusing in on valuation as a target of analysis “where the 
high resolution physiology of valuation can become a tractable goal” (p. 9).  As 
they opine, “Indeed, there is now broad consensus in the neuroscience of 
decision-making community that reward magnitude is represented in a small 
number of well-identified areas” (p. 1) and as such “[t]his could lead to more 
concrete and testable predictions using hypothesis testing” (p. 9).  After reviewing 
much of the fMRI research, Kable and Glimcher (2007), Glimcher (2009) and 
Levy et al. (2011) argue that a participant’s subjective valuation of a good is 
strongly correlated with particular BOLD variables extracted from these “well-
identified areas.”  We extracted percent signal change from regions asserted to be 
associated specifically with valuation in the decision-making process (Levy and 
Glimcher, 2012, Table 1). 
 Value is a tradeoff between the desirability or benefits of the product 
which differ from consumer to consumer and the price of the product which is the 
same for each consumer.  In order to take both of these components into account, 
we narrowed our search of the areas identified by Levy and Glimcher (2012) to 
only those areas with significant activation when looking at images of technology 
qualities and significant activation when looking at images with price alone (Tech 
v. Price) or when looking at images of a combination of technology and price and 
images of price alone (Combo v. Price).  This additional degree of narrowing the 
definition of neural activity adds even greater conservatism to the analysis.  We 
were able to do this because of the large subject sample we had available.  The 
BOLD variables in this paper are the percentage signal change difference in 
activation from the images that contain the qualities, e.g. the technology or 
combination images, and the activation from the images that contain the prices 
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alone, which is a significant difference from the BOLD construction in Crespi et 
al (2015), who were not guiding their BOLD choices from an underlying 
economic theory that implicated the differences between quality an prices.12   
Given these constraints set on our ROIs, our experiment showed 
significant differences in the eight value-related areas shown in table 2.   
 
Table 2.  Brain Activation Regions of Interest, BOLD percent signal change contrasts (N 
= 47) 
 










1. Left dorsolateral prefrontal 










2. Left dorsolateral prefrontal 
















































6. Left dorsomedial prefrontal 











7. Ventromedial prefrontal cortex (5, 
26, -10; 12 mm cube) 
active 
choice 








8. Ventromedial prefrontal cortex (5, 












Notes: * significant at p < 0.01 for the whole brain analysis. Regions 7 and 8 are based on ROI 
analysis. 
                                                          
12 Specifically, the percent signal change in bloodflow in an ROI from an image showing a 
technology or combination attribute is subtracted from the percent signal change in bloodflow 
when the participant sees a fixation point.  See Amaro Jr. and Barker (2006). 
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Empirical Focus on the Discount Impact. 
 Subjects in our experiment had familiarity with the products from both a 
passive viewing stage as well as repeated choices among the products in the 
active choice stage.  Our prior is that very little if any new information would be 
retrieved during the choice making, meaning the discount function dominates the 
decision time.  As such, equation (6) provides our refutable hypotheses for the 
model in this experiment.  In that equation, iψ  is a percentage difference, and our 
proxy for iψ  is the percentage signal change difference in activation from the 
images that contain the qualities, e.g. the technology or combination images, and 
the activation from the images that contain the prices alone.13   
Results. 
An initial test of the hypotheses is first performed by examining simple 
correlations for 47 participants (as 3 were unable to complete Phase 2 of the fMRI 
paradigm).  We calculate the average decision time over all choices for each 
participant.  We then compare this with the average percent signal change in brain 
activations, iψ , for each participant for the eight ROIs identified in Table 2.  Next 
we estimate the simple correlation, r, between these % signal changes and the 
average decision times for the 84 choices facing each participant.  Figure 4 plots 
time (milliseconds) on the vertical axes and the difference in brain activations on 
the horizontal axes (linear trend included).  The correlation ranges from a low of 
0.04 in the correlation between decision time and the activation in the left caudate 
(lCAU) and 0.41 when comparing decision time and activity in the right insula 
                                                          
13 Specifically, the percent signal change in bloodflow in an ROI from an image showing a 
technology or combination attribute is subtracted from the percent signal change in bloodflow 
when the participant sees a blurred image.  This is our proxy for ln iβ .  Our proxy for ln iδ is the 
percent signal change when observing a price-alone image and the percent signal change from 
observing the blurred baseline; hence (ln ln )i i iψ β δ= − .  
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(rINS).  As hypothesized, all areas show i) a positive correlation between the 
spread in the ROI activation differences and ii) that in participants with negative 
average percentage differences (e.g. ROI activation due to price is higher than 
activation due to combination or technology) generally have quicker decision 
times than participants with positive percentage differences (e.g. ROI brain 
activation due to price is lower than activation due to combination or technology), 
all else equal. These simple correlations are meaningful given the large sample 
size for studies in neuroeconomics (N = 47). Having a large sample size allows us 
to control for other covariates. 
 The second test of the hypotheses uses the full dataset from the two phases 
of the scanning experiment.  The data are composed of i=1,…,47 participants who 
make s=1,…,84 sequential but randomized decisions where each decision requires 
the choice of one of a pair of goods for a total of 3,948 observations.  The time to 
make each decision for each participant is 0,...,ist T= milliseconds.  The average 
time to decision over all participants and all choices is 2,637.51 milliseconds with 








   
 




 Because time is non-negative and the data are panel, where individual 
heterogeneity due to preferences is likely important, we model a multivariate 
regression using a random effects, exponential model with decision time 
parameterized using a vector, isz , an estimated vector of parameters that is 
identical for each participant,η ,and a random, participant-and-sequence specific 
parameter, isη , such that  
(7) 
'( )[ | ] is iszis is i isE t z e
η ην γ += = , 
where ~ ( , )i Beta a bν ; see Cameron and Trivedi 2005, pp. 803-808.14  We 
estimated the model using NLOGIT 5.0.   
 The key variable of interest is iψ .  Because of its construction, iψ  differs 
by participant i but not by sequence s, which is why the random effects procedure 
is chosen over the fixed effects panel approach.  We again use the eight regions of 
interest in table 2.15   
 Our variable reflecting the price spread, Price, is the absolute value of the 
difference in logged prices.  The mean of this Price variable was 0.33 with a 
standard deviation of 0.29.  Equation (6) shows that as this spread increases, the 
decision-making time decreases.   
                                                          
14 The technical motivation is an assumption that ( )~is ist Poisson µ  with ( , )~is i isµ ν γ σΓ , 
gamma distributed with mean i isν γ  and standard deviationσ . In our case, we are not interested in 
this model for its count-data properties, only for its estimation of the continuous underlying, 
conditional mean.  We are thankful to Colin Cameron for helpful discussions on this point. 
15 One of the complications with examining brain activations is the potential correlation among 
many different areas.  However, in this analysis, we are examining not the activations among 
different areas but rather the differences in activations and, as such, there are no a priori 
expectations that such correlations should be high. Indeed, regressing the activations in the ROI’s 
on each other to check for multicollinearity revealed little concern with R2 values ranging from a 
low of 0.07 with ldlPFC-c as the dependent variable to 0.34 with lCAU as the dependent variable.   
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 We cannot measure quality directly because we do not know how the 
participants perceive the quality of the products.  Nonetheless, the only difference 
in the images presented to the participants is in the wording of the labels and the 
prices.  To control for quality in the empirical model, we include binary variables 
denoting the types of choices appearing in the decision phase.  Letting the 
“familiar” product (i.e. milk created using non-hormone added, non-cloning 
technologies) be denoted “N,” a “hormone” technology denoted “H,” a “cloned” 
technology denoted “C,” then the binary variables show the pairs of choices 
facing a participant at the time of decision.  Specifically, the variable CC is equal 
to one if the choice is between two “cloned” products and zero otherwise; HH is 
equal to one if the choice is between two “hormone” products and zero otherwise 
(mean of CC and HH is 0.08 with a standard deviation of 0.28); HN is equal to 
one if the choice is between a hormone product and a traditional product; CN is 
equal to one if the choice is between a cloned product and a traditional product 
(mean of HN and CN is 0.33 with a standard deviation of 0.47).  The default is 
NN, a choice between two familiar products (mean of NN is 0.17 with a standard 
deviation of 0.37). Combinations of choices expand the number of sequences that 
must be offered, and the expense of the experiment itself, not to mention the time 
involved on the part of the participants, therefore pairings were conservatively 
chosen.  After consulting with experimental design specialists, the chosen 
experiments were 1/3 of all pairs being choices between the same technology (e.g. 
the aggregate share of HH, CC, and NN choices equal 1/3) and 2/3 of the choices 
comparing one unfamiliar technology with a familiar one (e.g. 1/3 of the decisions 
were HN and 1/3 of the decisions were CN).  Participants never faced a choice 
between 2 unfamiliar technologies (e.g. HC is never a choice).  Future research 
should consider such choices as well as consider the case of more than two 
choices; however, based upon the theoretical model, we should find that when 
facing a choice between familiar products (NN), the decision time should be 
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longer than in cases where an unfamiliar product is in the choice set. Although his 
model tests information signals and response time, we note that Rustichini (2009, 
p. 41) also opines that “when the quality of the signal is better … [it] may produce 
what we observe: longer response times with the better, more informative signal.”  
A confounding factor in the experiment is that the labels on the images for NN 
contain more characters than the labels for the other products.  As such these 
binary variables are also controlling for the amount of reading that is undertaken 
from image to image providing two reasons for a positive correlation between 
time to decision and NN. 
 The hypothesized correlation between the discount rate and time from 
equation (6) is negative.  We created two variables as proxies for the discount 
rate.  During prescreening, the participants underwent a test to determine their 
long-run discount rates from a series of questions about delayed monetary 
rewards following the procedures in Mitchell (1999).  This discounting rate, 
denoted k, averaged 0.022 with a standard deviation of 0.044.  As another 
measure of the opportunity cost of time, we also included the sequence order, 
1, 2,...,84s = , the simple order of the choice pairs in the active decision making 
phase. The sequence of pairs was randomized a priori and identical for all 
participants. We would expect that as s increases, the decision time decreases 
because participants are becoming better choice makers but also because they are 
getting tired of being in the confined scanner hence impinging on the opportunity 
cost of their time.   
  Finally, because decision times and certain demographic and 
physiological factors are known to be correlated, we also included a gender 
dummy variable (Gender=1 if male; 0 if female) and a chronological Age 
variable.  The average age of the 23 males and 24 females in the experiment was 
31.67 years (standard deviation 11.09).   
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 Table 3 presents the results of the eight regression models, which were 
similar in many ways. Model fit as measured by the log-likelihood and Akaike 
information criterion (AIC) showed little difference among the configurations 
with model 7 (vmPFC-t) exhibiting a slightly larger likelihood and smaller AIC 
than the other models.  The parameters a and b were statistically significantly 
different from zero at the 1-percent hypothesis level for all eight models 
indicating that the panel nature of the data benefits from the random effects 
treatment and equidispersion is rejected. 
 In all eight models, as prices diverged, participants made quicker decisions 
ceteris paribus as predicted.  Likewise, the presence of an unfamiliar product 
attribute and fewer characters to read in the choice labels as measured using the 
HH, HN, CC or CN variables lowered the response time compared to the familiar 
product (NN).  
 As participants grew more familiar with the process and stayed in the 
scanner longer, the response time as measured by the coefficient on s in all eight 
models also declined.  This is consistent with the conceptual model that decision 
time imposes an opportunity cost on the participant so as participants become 
more familiar with the products and the process, the decision-making becomes 
more automatic.  Participants likely develop a heuristic for deciding and that 
heuristic makes decisions less effortful and faster.  The constructed discount rate, 
k, likewise had the predicted negative sign in all models though was statistically 
insignificant in the model examining ROI 7, the ventromedial prefrontal cortex 
under the Tech-Price BOLD difference.  That both of these measures of personal 
discount rates were so consistent and with the posited negative sign is an 
important finding showing that the higher one’s discount rate, the quicker one will 
make a decision.  The older the participant, the longer was the response time in 
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each model. Males also reacted more quickly than females; this negative 
correlation was statistically significant in five of the models. 
 Finally, all but one of the BOLD activation variables for the regions of 
interest were of the predicted positive sign and all but two (the left insula, lINS, 
and the left caudate, lCAU) were statistically significantly different from zero.16  
The negative though significant sign on the ventromedial prefrontal cortex in the 
Tech-Price BOLD (ROI 7, vmPFC-t) is contrary to our hypothesis, which is 
interesting as it is posited as a particular area of interest in Levy and Glimcher 
(2012); however when the BOLD activation for this same ROI is taken from the 
Combo-Price choices, the sign is positive as hypothesized and statistically 
significant.  The contradictory but significant correlations are fascinating for this 
ROI in particular.  This region is known as not only important in valuation but as 
necessary for quick decisions in which subtle valuation tradeoffs must be made.  
People with physical damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex take much 
longer to make decisions that are similar in terms of payoffs (Gladwell 2005, p. 
59-60; Farb 2013, p. 6).  For this reason, activity in the vmPFC will correlate with 
faster decisions and there are arguably at least two operations occurring in this 
region (e.g. making decisions more quickly but also making decisions related to 
value tradeoffs) for which we cannot adequately control under the present 
experiment.  We agree with Levy and Glimcher (2012) that more analysis of this 
particular area and its potential as a generator of a neural money metric is an 
important next step for future research.   
  
                                                          
16 There is some evidence that subjects may still have been learning about the choices early on in 
the active choice portion of the experiment even after participating in the lengthy passive viewing 
portion.  Deleting the first quarter of observations in the data set and re-estimating the regressions 
did not change the sign or lower the significance on any of the ROIs except that for rINS, which 
became positive and significant with a coefficient of 0.62 and std. error of 0.04. 
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Table 3. Results of Time-Dependent Model of Consumer Choice 
  Regions of Interest (ROI)  
Variable 1. ldlPFC-t 2. ldlPFC-c 3. lINS 4. rINS 
Constant 2.37979*** 2.37256*** 2.39967*** 2.43846*** 
 (0.03293) (0.0378) (0.03296) (0.0346) 
Price -.12866*** -.13112*** -.12903*** -.12060*** 
 (0.01378) (0.01354) (0.01342) (0.01267) 
HH -.04937* -.05069** -.04992** -.05287** 
 (0.02608) (0.02497) (0.02501) (0.02548) 
HN -.06286*** -.06344*** -.06376*** -.06085*** 
 (0.01756) (0.01718) (0.01685) (0.01627) 
CC -.07804*** -.07846*** -.07808*** -.07951*** 
 (0.02729) (0.02499) (0.02497) (0.02724) 
CN -.05992*** -.06084*** -.06054*** -.05806*** 
 (0.01801) (0.01689) (0.01684) (0.01718) 
ROI .29364** .40294*** 0.02279 .46503*** 
 (0.13501) (0.11991) (0.04723) (0.03347) 
s -.00288*** -.00290*** -.00288*** -.00284*** 
 (0.00015) (0.00016) (0.00015) (0.00016) 
k -1.44278*** -1.55096*** -1.65078*** -1.84128*** 
 (0.17896) (0.15876) (0.18299) (0.1512) 
Gender -.04918** -0.03132 -.04726** -0.01935 
 (0.02255) (0.02668) (0.02277) (0.02402) 
Age .00404*** .00382*** .00383*** .00386*** 
 (0.00092) (0.00094) (0.00104) (0.0012) 
a 20.9924*** 18.9838*** 19.0952*** 22.0773*** 
 (7.72174) (6.94624) (6.70717) (6.08865) 
b 5605.87*** 5047.62*** 5083.12*** 5857.97*** 
 
(2089.533) (1881.867) (1781.439) (1601.556) 
log-likelihood -32132.33 -32131.45 -32133.13 -32116.09 





Table 3. Results of Time-Dependent Model of Consumer Choice-Continued 
  Regions of Interest (ROI)  
Variable 5. lCAU 6. ldmPFC/ACC 7. vmPFC-t 8. vmPFC-c 
Constant 2.39832*** 2.38167*** 2.35905*** 2.37920*** 
 (0.03393) (0.03352) (0.03669) (0.03431) 
Price -.12910*** -.12656*** -.13705*** -.12149*** 
 (0.0136) (0.01321) (0.01384) (0.01259) 
HH -.04994** -.05283** -.04675* -.05309** 
 (0.02507) (0.02473) (0.02500) (0.02418) 
HN -.06367*** -.06317*** -.05824*** -.06427*** 
 (0.01686) (0.01649) (0.01754) (0.01687) 
CC -.07802*** -.07929*** -.07744*** -.07544*** 
 (0.02539) (0.02513) (0.02312) (0.02577) 
CN -.06042*** -.06156*** -.05629*** -.06203*** 
 (0.01676) (0.01742) (0.01690) (0.01676) 
ROI 0.00232 .16582*** -.50661*** .25278*** 
 (0.02701) (0.0144) (0.03341) (0.02903) 
s -.00288*** -.00287*** -.00290*** -.00287*** 
 (0.00015) (0.00015) (0.00014) (0.00016) 
k -1.60701*** -1.82425*** -0.10047 -2.30068*** 
 (0.16302) (0.14794) (0.37602) (0.16613) 
Gender -.04720** -0.03262 -.05195** -.04721* 
 (0.02263) (0.02444) (0.02132) (0.02483) 
Age .00376*** .00351*** .00524*** .00453*** 
 (0.00096) (0.00089) (0.00095) (0.00104) 
a 19.0573*** 18.6687*** 14.2857*** 17.8170*** 
 (6.61623) (6.12647) (5.08861) (6.28361) 
b 5072.67*** 4944.15*** 3705.54*** 4710.44*** 
 (1756.052) (1650.047) (1347.723) (1674.904) 
 
log-likelihood -32133.16 -32124.745 -32107.18 -32125.07 
AIC 64292.3 64275.5 64240.4 64276.1 
Notes: dependent variable is time (milliseconds) with observations= 3948; participants=47; 
periods= 84. Standard errors appear below the coefficients in parentheses with ***, **, * 
indicating significance at the 1-, 5-, and 10-percent critical levels, respectively. Variable ROI 




 Other findings of particular interest are the positive and significant 
coefficients on the two activations taken from the left dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex (ldlPFC-t and ldlPFC-c).  These BOLD activations were taken from the 
passive viewing experiment stage when no choices were made.  The Mussa and 
Rosen (1978) model posits that consumers come to a decision with their 
valuations already in hand and uncertainty impacts those valuations.  The 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex has been shown to be associated with tasks 
requiring effortful decision-making, processing of uncertainty, and conscious 
deliberation especially in intertemporal choices (McClure et al. 2004, Volz et al. 
2005, Huettel et al. 2006, Bach et al. 2009, Hare et al. 2009) also as a processing 
area for future decisions.  Given the predicted positive sign on this ROI is upheld, 
consider the motivating case of the financial “black swan” and what happened in 
May of 2010.  A well-known phenomenon in trading markets is that volume and 
volatility are positively correlated and that correlation is often higher in 
downturns than in upturns (Hamilton and Lin 1998).  In the case of the flash 
crash, consider what our model would have predicted.  If a trader’s internal neural 
exchange rate for money remained mostly unchanged but her belief about value 
drops while seeing shares unexplainably plummeting (e.g. ln iβ  falls relative to
ln iδ ), the coefficients on ldlPFC-t and ldlPFC-c combined with the economic 
model predict that trades would have gotten faster ( iψ declines).  Faster trading 
leads to more volume and increasing volatility.  Thus while computers may have 
been responsible for the initial plummet, human traders made it worse because 
they responded to increased uncertainty with more frequent trades exactly as the 
model predicts.  This hyper-selling is precisely what Lee, Ready and Seguin 
(1994) observed in markets where trading halts were called because values 
declined quickly.  The same story could be made for any of the other ROIs in this 
model with the possible exception of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex in the 
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Tech-Price BOLD activation.  The dorsolateral prefrontal cortex is of particular 
interest because it has been discerned to be responsible for pre-processing value 
information especially in time decisions (see discussion in Kim, Hwang and Lee 
2008).  This is significant as brain activation in dlPFC during the passive viewing 
phase predicted decision times in the active choice phase.  As others have noted, 
the dlPFC appears to be an important brain region for understanding decision time 
when economic valuation is involved. 
Conclusion. 
This paper improves our understanding of the relationship between decision time 
and neural activations by unifying traditional economic theories of product 
differentiation and temporal discounting with models of decision time in the 
cognitive psychology and neuroscience literature.  The economic model results in 
testable hypotheses for a subsequent empirical study.  As an attempt to 
conceptualize a choice decision, the refutable hypotheses of the model were 
generally borne out in the experiment.  Further empirical studies built on 
theoretical foundations is needed.  This model is the first economic model to show 
that it is not simply uncertainty over quality or variance in prices that impact 
decision time, but the linkage between these two measures stemming from one’s 
internal valuation for a product’s quality and one’s personal valuation of money 
itself.  Because of that, the type of brain signal extraction from a neuroeconomic 
experiment can be guided by economic theory and those signal extractions can 
then be measured against decision time as proxies for these valuations. By 
comparison, a purely empirical study of decision time using similar data in Crespi 
et al. (2015), while instructive, lacks that economic underpinning for the 
construction of the BOLD variables used in the analysis.   
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 In this paper, participants in a neuroimaging (fMRI) experiment made 
choices regarding types of milk produced with or without an unfamiliar 
technology process (cloning or growth hormone) while their decision times were 
recorded.  The findings from simple correlations as well as multiple-regression, 
random-effects models largely support the hypothesized relations in areas of the 
brain known to be important to valuation and decisions under uncertainty.  It is 
important to note that the correlations between the BOLD variables and time have 
been found in other studies as well (Kable and Glimcher 2007, Basten et al 2010, 
Hare et al. 2009, 2011 and Crespi et al. 2015) but what differs here is that the 
correlations we find are consistent with the refutable hypotheses from an 
economic model of product differentiation. We did not conduct a post-hoc, 
whole-brain analysis with decision-time but instead, used a priori defined regions 
of interest known to be associated with valuation from the cognitive neuroscience 
literature. We then used only these in the econometric model to test the a priori 
hypothesis that marginal valuation should be positively correlated with time to 
decision as predicted by an economic theory thus expanding upon and 
complementing past studies while providing future guidance on the usage of 
fMRI in economic models. 
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